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Family-surgeon disagreements over interventions
James W. Jones, MD, PhD, MHA,a Laurence B. McCullough, PhD,a and Bruce W. Richman, MA,bHouston, Tex; and Columbia, MoYour hospital staff obligations include taking peri-
odic general surgical calls. A patient with advanced
lung cancer is admitted for correction of dehydration.
She is severely emaciated and is gasping despite an
oxygen mask. An effusion of the contralateral pleural
space has worsened her symptoms over the last few
days. She is comatose when you are first consulted. The
attending physician, a pulmonologist, asks you to per-
form a tube thoracostomy because it was requested by
the family. The patient’s husband emotionally prevails
upon you to conduct the procedure immediately. A
sister reports that the patient wanted very much to be
permitted to die at home. What is your proper ethical
course of action?
A. Consult the ethics committee at your institution.
B. Insert the chest tube as requested.
C. Explain the futility of the requested intervention to the
pulmonologist.
D. Gather the family and explain the futility of interven-
tion.
E. Decline to place the chest tube and suggest that another
surgeon be consulted.
The ethics and law of informed consent describe a clear
course for the appropriate decision-making process in this
case. The physicians involved have crucial roles to play
before the consent process starts: they are obligated to
identify the medically reasonable alternatives for manage-
ment of this patient’s condition, specifically including the
benefits and risks of each of the available options.1,2 “Med-
ically reasonable” means that the alternatives to be consid-
ered each offer a realistic expectation of net clinical benefit
to the patient.2 Reasonable expectations should be based
on the most reliable available evidence about the likely
outcomes of each alternative.3
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judgment about its medical value, physicians should not
assume that just because an intervention is available (the
needed expertise is on hand) or possible (the patient will
survive the procedure), it is medically reasonable. Ignoring
medical reasonableness involves ethical regression to the
mores of the mid 20th century. The clinical assessment of
available alternatives should be comprehensive, evaluating
mortality risk, short- and long-term risks of disease-related
and iatrogenic morbidity, lost functional status, pain, emo-
tional distress, and suffering. It is important for the surro-
gate who is not directly suffering to understand that, in
such cases, therapy extending life actually extends suffering.
Ethically, reasonable medical alternatives must meet a com-
prehensive test of beneficence.4 There is no obligation,
either ethically or legally, to offer as an available or possible
alternative a procedure that fails this crucial criterion.
Postponement of mortality should be more than incre-
mental for justification of a procedure when it is likely to
cause additional morbidity, misery, and lost functional
status.5,6 At times, procedures of lesser magnitude, because
they demand less of the patient, are done in accordance
with the wishes of the patient’s surrogate and the attending
non-surgeon . In such cases, an additional criterion to the
procedure’s magnitude is needed. When the morbidity
load eliminates the possibility of the patient’s further inter-
action with the environment, then the physician is not
obligated to seek further reduction of disease-related mor-
tality risk.7
The clinical decision that a particular invasive proce-
dure is medically reasonable is accepted in both the ethical
and legal formulations of informed consent as a judgment
properly reserved to the expert professional. Neither pa-
tients nor their family members, with few exceptions, are
adequately trained to make this critical judgment. Excep-
tions may include patients with a chronic illness who have
accumulated extensive experience in its course and treat-
ment, and have become sufficiently sophisticated to partic-
ipate knowledgeably in complex medical management de-
cisions. This exception does not apply in the present case.
The physician’s remaining legal obligation in the in-
formed consent process is the alternative offer of noninter-
vention, which properly includes an explanation of its ben-831
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articulated even if the physician considers it to be medically
unreasonable, though he should have no hesitation about
expressing such an opinion.
It is the patient’s responsibility in the informed consent
process to select from among the medically reasonable
alternatives, or to exercise his or her negative right and elect
nonintervention, on the basis of whatever values, prefer-
ences, or beliefs the patient wishes to invoke. The concept
of informed consent does not endow the patient with a
positive right to demand that the physician undertake in-
terventions that are not reliably expected to provide a
medical benefit.1,4
Appropriate surrogates assume decisive authority when
an adult patient has lost the capacity to make his or her own
decisions, as in this case. The surrogate decision maker is
ethically and often legally obligated to select the alternative
that the patient is likely to have selected, based on any
previously expressed preferences, values, and beliefs. When
no such preferences are now known, the surrogate should
select from among the available options a measure that
will protect and promote the patient’s health-related
interests.1,2
In this case, a tube thoracostomy is not reliably ex-
pected to alter the outcome of the patient’s underlying
condition, which will be imminent death before recovery of
interactive capacity.7 The surgeon should therefore recom-
mend to the pulmonologist and to the patient’s husband,
her legal surrogate, that the requested procedure not be
performed.
The surgeon should also recommend that the patient’s
sister be invited to discuss her report that the patient would
not want this intervention and wishes to die at home. If the
sister cites prior conversations with the patient, and/or
other shared life experiences supporting her representation
of the patient’s wishes, then that report should be consid-
ered authoritative and obligates the family and the treat-
ment team to try to satisfy the patient’s desires.
The surgeon should privately explain to the pulmo-
nologist that the husband’s request for an immediate tho-
racostomy is critically and doubly flawed. First, the husband
is not qualified by training or experience to select the most
medically reasonable intervention from among the available
options. Second, if the report of the patient’s sister is indeed
authoritative, the husband is ethically (and perhaps legally)obligated to respect and implement his wife’s preferences.
Option C is therefore the ethically acceptable alternative in
this case. Option D is an important next step in expressing
empathy for the family’s emotional distress and demon-
strating proper respect for their struggle to make the best
possible decision on the patient’s behalf. The informed
consent process is a useful but often under-used method of
articulating ethical values in cases like this.2,6
The ethics and the associated body of law governing the
informed consent and surrogate decision-making processes
are now well developed and substantially settled. Not every
problem in surgical and medical ethics remains a matter of
infinite debate. Consultation with an ethics committee
should be reserved for the most fluid and vexing of contro-
versies, and is not necessary in this case, eliminating Option
A. Option B, inserting the chest tube to meet what you
have determined are inappropriate demands by a poorly
informed internist and an emotionally overwrought spouse,
compromises both surgical integrity and the informed con-
sent process. Not incidentally, it also would subject the
patient to unnecessary disease-related and iatrogenic mor-
bidity during a prolonged expiration process. Option E
incorrectly suggests that your conclusion is a matter of
personal idiosyncrasy, and that another competent, simi-
larly informed surgeon would easily reach a different benef-
icence-based clinical conclusion.
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